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Summary
Our article uses a new institutional economics (NIE) framework to explore the role of voluntary industry standards in the development and implementation of environmental supplier-management programs in the computer industry. We examine two different voluntary standards, one for the management of design for environment (DfE) in the semiconductor fabrication equipment sector and the other for assessing the implementation and use of environmental management systems throughout the computer industry supply chain. We compare and contrast the two standards to explain why the former was widely adopted and has helped integrate DfE into buyer-supplier relations among adopters, whereas the latter failed to gain acceptance. In line with NIE logic, both standards aimed to lower transaction and customization costs by setting "rules of the game" for interfirm transactions that would help simplify and routinize novel environmental supply-chain programs and activities. Their differential success can be elucidated in terms of how well each met the NIE criteria for remediableness and legitimacy. We conclude that voluntary standards have the potential to play an important role in promoting DfE in industrial supply chains. We further conclude that NIE provides a conceptual framework of great value to industrial ecologists who analyze how industry standards and other institutions help firms move toward more sustainable supply-chain management practices.
Introduction
From an industrial ecology perspective, one of the most interesting and potentially important recent changes in business is the emergence of programs in which firms work with their suppliers to improve the environmental attributes of their products, processes, and management practices. Because they involve companies working together across industry supply chains, these environmental supply-chain management (SCM) programs have great potential to improve environmental performance at the industry level. As a result, they are being followed with growing interest by industrial ecologists and others in the academic community interested in innovative approaches to environmental sustainability (e.g., Rosen et al. 2000; Preuss 2001; Bowen et al. 2001) . In this article, we further this academic pursuit by examining the role of voluntary industry standards in the development and implementation of environmental SCM programs in the computer industry.
In the 1990s, growing numbers of companies in the computer industry supply chain began incorporating environmental elements into their supplier-management programs in response to growing customer interest, eco-label requirements, European product take-back regulations, increasingly rigorous and time-consuming environmental permit requirements in the United States, and the desire to minimize the risk of supply interruptions and liabilities due to environmental failures (Beckman et al. 2001) . These elements include design for environment (DfE) programs established to induce suppliers to design more environmentally sound process equipment and components and environmental management systems (EMSs) programs to prompt vendors to improve their EMS performance.
Promulgated by a growing number of trade and business organizations, voluntary environmental standards simultaneously emerged as a major force in corporate environmental management. Among the best known are the Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible Care program, the International Chamber of Commerce's Business Charter for Sustainable Development, and the International Standards Organization's (ISO's) ISO 14000 environmental management standards. In these and similar programs, interested managers from member firms organize a committee to compile a set of standard environmental principles and expectations for members to follow on a voluntary basis Ehrenfeld 1996, 1997) .
This article focuses on two sets of voluntary environmental standards issued by industry trade associations to facilitate environmental improvement in the computer industry supply chain. The first, the SEMI S2 standard, is a supplier DfE standard that establishes a common framework for semiconductor manufacturers and their equipment suppliers to improve the environmental health and safety (EH&S) design characteristics of semiconductor process equipment. It was issued by Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI), a global trade association that represents semiconductor and flatpanel-display process equipment and materials suppliers. The organization focuses on standard setting and various market-expansion activities. The second standard, which we call the PIBA-CIQC standard, is a supplier EMS standard jointly developed by two organizations, the Pacific Industry and Business Association (PIBA) and the Computer Industry Quality Conference (CIQC).
1 PIBA is an association of West Coast businesses, located primarily in northern California, that discusses public policy issues and promotes best practices relating to EH&S issues and facilities design. The much more specialized CIQC was a small network of computer original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), companies that produce the end products in the computer supply chain. It was organized to promote continuous improvement in electronic component quality and the practices used in the purchase and delivery of electronic components.
The SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards differ in important ways from the conventional technical product and process standards promulgated by computer industry trade organizations in recent years. Developed to help manufacturers take advantage of the beneficial network effects that result when the computer hardware and software produced by different companies can smoothly interconnect and operate as an inte-grated system, conventional technical standards guide the design choices made as hardware and software products are developed (David 1987; Baskin et al. 1998; Shapiro and Varian 1999) . In contrast, the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards set forth guidelines and expectations for manufacturers to follow when dealing with their vendors in the area of environment, health, and safety. They do not specify technical characteristics of products or processes or rules for interface compatibility and adaptability. Instead, like the Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible Care program and the ISO 14001 environmental management standard, they provide guidance and standardized procedures for improving environmental management practices.
The SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards, however, also differ from the Responsible Care and ISO 14001 standards. In contrast to these better known standards, whose prescriptions tell adopting firms how to structure their own internal environmental practices and management systems, the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards look outward, providing rules for manufacturers to follow when they ask their suppliers to improve the environmental attributes of their management practices or product designs. The SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards also create rules and formats to guide the suppliers' response to these external, customer demands for environmental improvement.
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Industrial ecologists have begun recognize the need to broaden the purview of their field beyond its traditional focus on the flows of energy and material that give shape, at a macrolevel, to the structure of modern industrial ecosystems, the technical systems that mediate these flows, and engineering designs to monitor the flows and improve the technical systems. In a recent article in this journal, for example, Andrews (2000) argued that developing a social science-informed understanding of the role of human and organizational agency in the structural evolution of industrial ecosystems would help industrial ecologists develop the predictive data and models needed to assist government and corporate decision makers in making better environmental policy and management decisions. Andrews made a strong case for the value of using microeconomic theory, particularly transaction cost economics and agency theory, as a conceptual foundation for dissecting the behavior of the firms, individuals, and other economic actors that manage the movement of materials and energy flows through industrial ecosystems. We seconded that argument in our article on the structure of environmental SCM programs in the computer industry (Rosen et al. 2000) . In our view, it is critically important that industrial ecologists use these and other social science theories to analyze the economic factors that lead economic agents to consciously reduce the useand waste-of natural resources and lessen damage to the earth's biosphere. Such microlevel work will enable industrial ecologists to evaluate the comparative efficacy of different approaches to moving industry toward environmental sustainability.
The purpose of this article is to use the lens of the "new institutional economics" (NIE) to explore the ways in which environmental managers in the computer industry supply chain have sought to use the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards to reduce the cost of creating and administering environmental SCM programs. NIE economists study and theorize about the evolution and impact of institutions, such as laws, standards, and industry norms, on firm behavior, market structure, technological innovation, and economic growth. 3 We show that NIE provides a powerful conceptual apparatus for exploring the ways in which standards and other institutional "rules of the game" can foster or inhibit the sort of technological and managerial innovations desired by industrial ecologists. Using NIE, we examine why environmental managers in key companies in the computer industry supply chain turned to industry standards to surmount a variety of obstacles to the implementation of their supplier DfE and EMS initiatives. We also investigate and explain the differential success of the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards. Whereas SEMI S2 has been widely adopted and spurred many semiconductor equipment suppliers to engage in DfE, resulting in significant improvement in the environmental performance of their customers' manufacturing operations, both versions of the PIBA-CIQC standard are currently inactive. We use NIE to scrutinize these contrasting outcomes and assess what has made SEMI S2 a successful standard.
The article begins with a brief description of our research methodology. The next section describes what we learned in our research about why and how the standards were established, the content of the standards, and the extent to which the standards have been adopted. We then place this knowledge in the context of the theoretical work on standards from NIE economists, using NIE to explore the role of industry standards in environmental SCM in the computer industry in more analytical terms. We use this microeconomic analysis of the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards to demonstrate the value of incorporating NIE theory into industrial ecology research. We conclude with an assessment of the importance of SEMI S2 as a model standard for promoting DfE across industry supply chains and suggestions for future research.
Our Field Research
This article evolved from exploratory research on what firms in the computer industry are doing to establish and organize environmental SCM programs. We focused on companies in three parts of the supply chain: (1) OEMs, companies such as Hewlett-Packard (HP), IBM, and Sun Microsystems that make the end products for the industry, (2) disk drive and disk-drive component manufacturers, and (3) semiconductor and semiconductor manufacturing equipment manufacturers. Our research is based on telephone interviews with environmental and/or procurement managers at 15 firms in these sectors as well as with staff members of SEMI and a consulting firm, California Environmental Associates, that was active in PIBA. We conducted interviews at these companies in 1997 and 1998. To gain longitudinal perspective on the implementation of the two standards, we conducted less formal follow-up interviews in 2001 and 2002 at SEMI and a subset of the OEM and semiconductor firms originally studied 4 and interviewed a consultant 5 who has been an active participant in the SEMI S2 revision committee. More detail on the companies we interviewed and our original interview guide was published by Rosen and colleagues (2000) . In addition, we reviewed a wide array of articles on voluntary environmental standards, conventional technical standards in the electronics and telecommunications industry, and institutional economics. We also reviewed articles on environmental SCM published since we did our original research.
The SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC Standards and Their Evolutionary Context
The SEMI S2 Standard According to our contacts, the firms involved in setting the first SEMI EH&S standards in 1982 participated for three main reasons. First, they wished to protect employees and their families from health risks associated with the semiconductor manufacturing process and its effluents and emissions. Second, they sought to protect themselves from the possible environmental liabilities, regulatory difficulties, and public relations troubles associated with community discovery of environmental problems in the semiconductor industry. Third, and perhaps most importantly, they wanted to protect themselves from the costs and business risks associated with asking equipment manufacturers to improve EH&S features on a custom basis.
Semiconductor manufacturing equipment is expensive and technically complex, requiring significant investments in research and development (R&D) for each new generation of semiconductor chips. To minimize costs, semiconductor equipment manufacturers strive to identify a common set of requirements across their customer set, the semiconductor manufacturers, against which they design new generations of equipment. The result is a "plain vanilla" product that can be sold to all semiconductor manufacturers. In the early 1980s, this plain vanilla equipment lacked many basic safety features and provided substandard environmental performance (e.g., excessive water usage, toxic chemical consumption, air emissions). Large semiconductor fabricators, such as Intel, Motorola, Texas Instruments (TI), and IBM, had to evaluate the equipment after purchase and modify it to bring its safety and environmental performance up to their own, comparatively high, internal corporate standards (Parker and Foster 1999) . This expensive and time-consuming process became more and more burdensome as the cost of developing new generations of semiconductor chips and designing and constructing new fabrication facilities increased and the speed with which firms needed to bring the new chips to market shrank. It was a particularly serious problem for the market leader, Intel, whose competitive advantage depended on its ability to bring out advanced chips ahead of its rivals while minimizing its costs as much as possible.
Intel and other large semiconductor fabricators that desired to improve the EH&S performance of their process equipment confronted three major problems in their attempts to achieve this goal. First, their requests to suppliers to incorporate EH&S features not included in the plain vanilla models of their products resulted in increased product engineering and customization charges. Such charges cover redesigning the equipment, rewriting training manuals, maintaining specialized spare parts, and so on. Although such charges reflect the real costs of customization, they also create expropriation hazards (i.e., opportunities for the equipment suppliers to price gouge). 6 Second, the fabricators' requests for improved EH&S performance threatened to slow down the development of their equipment. Designing custom EH&S features directly into the product would significantly reduce the amount of time that a fabricator spent retrofitting the equipment once it was in its factory. While this design work was proceeding, however, there was a risk that rivals might order and take delivery of new generations of plain vanilla equipment, jumping ahead of the firms that insisted on equipment with advanced EH&S features.
Third, semiconductor fabricators encountered resistance by equipment suppliers to the imposition of EH&S requirements. Suppliers expressed concerns about cost (e.g., to hire external resources) and their lack of internal capability to understand and implement the required features. Small suppliers with limited experience and capability in EH&S were particularly reluctant to comply with improvement requests in this area.
Intel and the other firms that took the lead in developing the SEMI S2 standard believed that by invoking a common set of requirements across the industry, they could do away with the customization costs and time lags associated with enacting EH&S specifications and reduce supplier resistance to compliance. Intel took the lead in getting other SEMI members to participate in a task force to develop EH&S standards. Work on the original SEMI S2 standard began in the late 1980s. It has been under almost constant revision since SEMI members first formally approved it in 1991. SEMI S2 aims to control and eliminate EH&S hazards during the equipment's life cycle (i.e., its installation, operation, maintenance, service, and disposal). It is to be "applied during the design, construction, and evaluation of semiconductor equipment, in order to reduce the expense and disruptive effects of redesign and retrofit" and "incorporated by reference in equipment purchase specifications" (SEMI 2002, 7, section 7.1).
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SEMI S2 sets forth a detailed set of information that equipment manufacturers are to provide semiconductor fabricators to show that they have evaluated and taken steps to improve the EH&S characteristics of their equipment. Its environmental provisions require equipment vendors to provide fabricators with detailed information on a range of environmental performance characteristics (table 1) and to document features that improve environmental performance as well those that do not meet SEMI S2 criteria (table 2). To ensure the credibility of the information compiled and provided by fabricators, this material is to be submitted for review by an in-house body or independent laboratory or product safety consulting firm that meets SEMIdefined provisions (SEMI 2002) .
The intent of this environmental profiling is to create a basis for semiconductor fabricators and their equipment suppliers to negotiate goals, timetables, and action plans for correcting deficiencies. It enables them to discuss and reach agreement on mutually acceptable DfE projects that address documented weaknesses in the equipment. Journal of Industrial Ecology Table 1 Environmental performance documentation that the supplier is to provide the user under SEMI S2
Energy consumption information Chemical mass balance information (such as resource consumption rates, chemical process inefficiencies, solid and hazardous waste generation, etc.) Information regarding routes of unintended effluent, wastes, emissions, and by-products release to the environment; devices to monitor and control such releases; and information to monitor, prevent, and control unintended releases Information regarding routes of intended release of effluents, wastes, and emissions and features to monitor and control such releases List of items that become solid waste as a result of operation, maintenance, and servicing of the equipment and that contain substances whose disposal might be regulated (e.g., beryllium-containing parts, mercury switches, etc.) Information relating to maintenance procedures with potential environmental impacts, including identification of procedural steps by which releases might occur and the nature of the releases, waste characteristics, and methods to minimize the volume of effluents, wastes, or emissions generated during maintenance procedures
Source: Adapted from SEMI 2002 (chap. 9).
Table 2 "Environmental considerations" documentation that the supplier is to provide the user under SEMI S2
Information regarding design features that conserve resources, including water, ionized water, compressed gases, chemicals, and packaging Information about chemical selection methods and process, maintenance, and utility uses and criteria for increasing effectiveness, reducing environmental impacts, volume, and toxicity and improving other environmental aspects Information about design features to prevent or control unintended effluent, waste, and air emission releases, including chemical storage and secondary containment features, gas and liquid sensing equipment and alarms, etc. Information relating to manufacturer's efforts to minimize the generation of hazardous wastes, solid wastes, wastewater, and air emissions, especially features that facilitate recycling or reuse opportunities or otherwise reduce environmental impacts and that prevent mixing of incompatible waste streams Information describing approaches to integrating effluent and emission controls into the equipment Information about efforts to reduce wastes, effluents, emissions, and by-products Information regarding features that would promote equipment and component reuse or refurbishing or material recycling upon decommissioning 
The PIBA-CIQC Standard
The motivation for developing the PIBA-CIQC standard was similar to that for developing the SEMI S2 standard: A set of companies, in this case the computer OEMs, wished to encourage improved environmental performance on the part of their suppliers, but minimize the cost of doing so. The direct impetus was the administrative havoc stimulated by a sudden explosion of customer, investor, and environmentalist interest in environmental management practices in the industry in the mid 1990s. HP reported that by 1996 it was receiving more than 1,000 customer requests a month for EH&S information. Many included detailed questions relating to the environmental management practices of HP's suppliers (Elsie 1997 ). The OEMs not only had to answer these questions themselves many times over, but also passed them back through their supply chains. Each questionnaire they received was different from the others, requiring individual attention. As the administrative chaos asso-ciated with completing the surveys mounted, the OEMs became motivated to find an alternative approach.
Work on the standard began in the fall of 1995. Hsia Choong, a procurement manager at HP, initiated a task force called the "environmental committee" at the CIQC to develop a standardized approach to dealing with the many questionnaires moving through the computer industry supply chain. Because the CIQC was established to rationalize procurement in the computer industry through standard setting and information sharing, Choong thought it was an appropriate venue for developing a procurementrelated EH&S standard. She quickly realized, however, that its members lacked the experience and expertise in the EH&S field to develop a useful standard. She then turned to PIBA, an organization dedicated to the development, sharing, and dissemination of information relating to EH&S best practice, and helped organize the International Supplier Forum (ISF), which took the lead in developing a standardized supplier questionnaire. The ISF contained representatives from about 20 San Francisco Bay Area electronics companies and consulting firms, including managers at four of the six OEMs we studied (HP, IBM, Sun, and "Anonymous OEM") as well as one of the disk-drive manufacturers, Quantum (now part of Maxtor). The ISF drafted the questionnaire that became the PIBA-CIQC standard. Choong, serving as liaison between the two groups, brought this questionnaire back to the environmental committee of the CIQC. After six months of review and very minor revisions, the membership approved it, issuing it as CIQC Standard 00014. PIBA's ISF subsequently began developing supplementary documentation to support the questionnaire without participation from the CIQC, work that was never completed (Anderson and Choong 1997; Krut and Karasin 1999) .
The questionnaire was designed to give buyers (1) a common mechanism for assessing their vendors' current environmental management policies, programs, and practices and the progress toward improvement and (2) a common instrument with which they could communicate to vendors their heightened expectations of the vendors' environmental performance. The first part of the questionnaire contained seven general questions for all vendors relating to continuous improvement and compliance assurance, such as whether the vendor has written environmental policies and written performance objectives. The second part contained more detailed questions for critical suppliers, high-volume suppliers, and suppliers whose processes had major environmental impacts and liabilities. These questions concerned the suppliers' environmental risks and their waste management and pollution prevention practices. 8 Thus, like SEMI S2, the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire specified the information to be provided by suppliers as input to the process of negotiating goals and timetables for improvement, rather than establishing specific performance targets or requirements. Both standards provided supracontract, industrywide frameworks for collecting information, but left it to the participants to work together to analyze the information and determine an appropriate response. This approach was consistent with the relational contracting environment prevalent in the computer industry supply chain, in which manufacturers prefer to develop long-term, mutually optimizing associations with their vendors rather than rely on short-term, arm's-length interactions. Computer industry firms consider relational contracting to be the key to successful supplier management in their fiercely competitive industry. Benefits include protection from various transaction hazards, lower long-term costs, smoother intercompany logistics, and mutual access to technological innovation (Rosen et al. 2000) .
Divergent Paths
Despite having similar goals, the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards have met with very different fates. On the one hand, the PIBA-CIQC standard has been an almost complete failure. To our knowledge only one firm, HP, has integrated the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire into its procurement and supplier-management programs. More tellingly, neither PIBA nor the CIQC support or publicize the questionnaire any longer. Under its new name, Electronics Industry Quality Conference, the CIQC "archived" its Standard 0014, meaning it was put on its inac-tive list. PIBA's ISF went out of business before completing work on several supporting documents to help members implement its questionnaire.
On the other hand, SEMI S2 has met with broad acceptance and has been incorporated into the semiconductor industry's environmental SCM practices throughout the world. According to SEMI EH&S staff, many SEMI member firms apply S2 in their equipment procurement. Although they do not keep figures on how many copies of the various versions of SEMI S2 have sold or what firms have purchased them, they report that SEMI S2 has sold very well, with the 1997 version of the SEMI S2 standard, in particular, a big seller.
Another sign of SEMI S2's success is that it has undergone repeated revisions at the behest of members seeking its expansion to cover an increasingly broad range of EH&S equipment design issues, including resource conservation and materials procurement, storage and disposal, and toxics reductions and emissions control, as well as many safety issues and ergonomics. Members have also formed task forces to develop supplementary EH&S standards to provide additional guidance to firms implementing the environmental provisions of SEMI S2. 9 In 1997, this activity inspired SEMI to create an EH&S division to give more visibility and staff support to member efforts in the EH&S area (SEMI 1997) .
Most importantly, a number of equipment suppliers are now performing leading-edge R&D in the EH&S area. Prompted by SEMI S2's documentation and third-party review requirements, a number of equipment suppliers have rationalized management systems and developed information management systems that help product design engineers access SEMI S2 and other relevant SEMI (and non-SEMI) EH&S design requirements, rationales, and other useful guidance and information (Parker and Foster 1999) . Intel and other fabricators and their suppliers also ask their EH&S staff to participate in the crossfunctional teams involved in the design process. The fruits of this activity are evident in SEMI EH&S division-sponsored and -cosponsored technical workshops and symposia. The workshops and symposia provide venues for researchers and designers to discuss and share information about the technical challenges they face and the solutions they are developing.
10 Superior EH&S performance has become a sales tool for many equipment suppliers. SEMI EH&S staff told us that leading equipment manufacturers use participation in SEMI EH&S technical workshops (and the receptions that follow) as much to market their environmentally advanced equipment as to discuss the technical issues with which they are dealing. Design for environment, health, and safety (DfEH&S 11 ) has also become part of corporate culture for many suppliers. As an Intel contact put it, serious DfEH&S is a "matter of course now, a part of their culture," at a number of its major suppliers. They "wouldn't go back now."
An NIE Perspective
What conclusions should industrial ecologists draw from this case study of two attempts, one successful, the other a failure, to use voluntary industry standards to roll out and administer environmental SCM programs in the computer industry? On the basis of our preliminary research, we argue that industry standards are an institutional mechanism with a great deal of potential to facilitate and rationalize environmental change across industry supply chains. Whereas the PIBA-CIQC case shows that it can be difficult for trade organizations to develop voluntary standards that meet with widespread acceptance, the success of the SEMI S2 standard suggests that a well-formulated standard can achieve broad acceptance. Further, the SEMI S2 case shows that such standards can help firms work with their suppliers to improve their industry's environmental performance at a systems level. This suggests that voluntary industry standards have the capacity to serve industrial ecologists as mechanisms to guide industrial systems toward greater environmental sustainability.
To support this contention and to uncover the root causes of the PIBA-CIQC failure, we evaluate the SEMI and PIBA-CIQC standards in the context of work done by economists who have investigated the ways, such as through industry standards, that institutions help shape the behavior of firms. Specifically, we employ an NIE conceptual framework to more fully explore the role voluntary standards play in the development and support of environmental SCM. "New institutional economics" is the label given to work by a diverse group of economists who study and theorize about the evolution of institutions and their impact on markets and economic activity. The term "institutions" refers to the following.
• (Williamson 1996, 4-5) 12 NIE research has generated theoretical concepts and arguments that can be brought to bear on an analysis of the role of voluntary industry standards in environmental SCM in general and in supplier DfE and EMS in the computer industry supply chain in particular. Of particular interest to us is a growing body of general theory and research concerning the formation of formal and informal institutions in economies and industries undergoing rapid technological and economic change and their impact on economic behavior and growth (Nelson and Sampat 2001) . Also relevant is work that focuses specifically on the formation and impact of committee-based industry standards (e.g., Lane 1997) and, even more narrowly, on the formation of formal technical compatibility standards that facilitate innovation and the "interoperability" of electronics components and networked systems in the electronics and telecommunications industries (e.g., David and Rothwell 1996; David 1987; Besen and Saloner 1989) . 13 We start by using insights from NIE to provide a theoretically informed explanation of the functions standards may play in the establishment and administration of environmental SCM programs in the computer industry. We then use this lens to highlight the key factors that differentiate the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards in order to explain their divergent fates.
The Formation of the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC Standards from an NIE Perspective
From an NIE perspective, firms turn to formal committee-based (as well as informal, de facto, market-based) industry standard setting to address problems that arise because of weaknesses in the institutional environment in which market activities take place. Weak institutional environments exist where there are no wellrecognized and widely accepted rules, no laws, regulations, customs, or conventions, to guide and constrain how buyers and sellers transact with one another. Such conditions exist in societies undergoing transitions from premarket or command economies to market economies, such as late medieval Europe and China, Russia, and eastern Europe in the 1990s. They also exist in highly developed market economies when rapid technological, economic, or social change renders old laws, regulations, and customs incapable of meeting the needs of firms for rational, predictable, and efficient ways of transacting with one another under the new conditions. The lack of clear, general-purpose institutional rules and norms leads to confusion, uncertainty, and inefficiency that can make it cost ineffective for parties to engage in transactions that would make economic sense in a more suitable institutional environment (Williamson 1993) .
This was the situation that EH&S managers faced when they first began working with their suppliers to improve their environmental performance in the late 1980s and early 1990s. U.S. command/control government environmental regulations required firms to reduce their pollution emissions and follow certain protocols in the management of hazardous waste exclusively in their own manufacturing facilities. The regulations' rigid end-of-pipe focus gave little institutional guidance to firms interested in using frontof-pipe DfE or innovative EMS practices to reduce their own environmental impacts. They provided absolutely no guidance to firms that wanted to ask their suppliers to improve their environmental management practices or the environmental characteristics of their products and equally little direction to the suppliers that were being asked by their customers to make changes in their environmental management or product design practices.
As identified by NIE economists, the key problem buyers and sellers face where there is little or no institutional support for new patterns of exchange is high transaction costs. The lack of rules increases both the ex ante and ex post transactions costs associated with reaching across firm boundaries and asking suppliers to improve their environmental management practices or product designs. Ex ante transaction costs include the costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement (Williamson 1985) . In the absence of generally accepted laws, conventions, or customs to guide and constrain them, a firm and its supplier cannot take advantage of the transactional economies of scale that result from being able to use the same basic terms and conditions of a buyer-seller relationship across many transactions. Instead, the firm and its supplier must explore and stipulate every detail of each and every transaction they have with each other, which "can become expensive very quickly" (Masten 1991, 207) . This is likely to be especially difficult, time consuming, and costly when the details of the exchange relate to something as controversial, politically charged, and potentially costly as DfE projects or the improvement of a supplier's EMS.
The ex post transaction costs of contractingsuch as the costs of monitoring compliance, losses from opportunistic behavior due to a lack of safeguards (or, alternatively, excess costs due to operating with too many safeguards), and haggling over details of how to adapt agreements in light of changing circumstances, enforcement costs, and other administrative costs of implementing the contract-are also higher when the institutional environment is weak, again because the parties must work everything out on a caseby-case basis (Williamson 1985; Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Expropriation (i.e., price-gouging) hazards also tend to be more salient in environments in which accepted monitoring and enforcement of rules of the game have yet to emerge. Such ex post costs tend to be especially high when one or both parties make unique, relationship-specific investments in untested, capital-and knowledge-intensive technological assets, as is usually the case with supplier DfE projects.
The combination of weak institutions and customized investments also undermines the efficiency of production. Without institutions that encourage buyers and sellers to use a specific set of practices over and over again in multiple trading relationships, it is difficult for them to develop and master techniques for getting things done quickly and efficiently. Opportunities to learn from experience are greatly reduced, as are the incentives to delve into a subject with research and disciplined experimentation to perfect the production processes and management techniques used in production (Nelson and Sampat 2001; David 1995) . Buyers and sellers also find it difficult to coordinate with one another at a level that enables suppliers to take advantage of economies of scale, or, in networked industries such as telecommunications and electronics, to achieve the level of synchronized effort needed to develop complementary, connectable, and/or interoperable products (Farrell and Saloner 1985) .
According to NIE, buyers and sellers must find ways to strengthen institutions to mitigate the problems of high transaction costs, particularly the negotiation, customization, coordination, and enforcement costs. Theoretically, transactors will be driven by these problems to engage in formal and informal standard setting and other forms of institution building in order to create a stable, efficiency-promoting framework in which to transact with one another. Clear-cut, widely followed rules of the game promote efficiency and stability in exchange because they legitimize, simplify, and routinize market activity. As Nelson and Sampat put it, "well understood rules . . .give a certain predictability to what others parties will do in a particular context that permits individual decision-making, and multi-party negotiation, to proceed with some degree of certainty, the actions of different individuals to be coordinated, and efficient transactional agreements achieved" (Nelson and Sampat 2001, 33) .
Our research bears out this NIE theory, as both the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire and the SEMI S2 standard were developed to help firms reduce transaction costs by legitimizing, simplifying, and routinizing the incorporation of environmental elements into supplier management. The PIBA-CIQC questionnaire was intended to simplify and standardize the process by which OEMs communicate their heightened interest in EMSs to their parts and component vendors and get environmental performance information from them, relieving OEMs of the need to formulate their own questionnaires. Equally important, the questionnaire was intended to make it possible for vendors to generate standardized responses, saving them the time and effort it would have taken to answer idiosyncratic queries from each customer (Anderson and Choong 1997; Krut and Karasin 1999) .
SEMI S2 was designed to provide similar benefits. It creates uniform EH&S documentation and review expectations that require semiconductor equipment suppliers to provide the same information with the same third-party review to all purchasers of their equipment. Thus, it lowers the customization-related transaction costs associated with the establishment of supplier DfE programs. It does so by sparing both the equipment suppliers and their customers the expense of negotiating the details of what information to provide with each and every contract.
14 Further, SEMI S2 enables equipment vendors to take advantage of economies of scale in the collection, assessment, and review of this information, for it requires them to provide the same information and certification to all purchasers of their equipment. By following its guidelines, equipment manufacturers are able to manage their DfE programs so they can take advantage of efficiencies that result from being able to work simultaneously on the same problems with multiple customers. If they can sell equipment with advanced EH&S features to many fabricators, they can also take advantage of economies of scale in manufacturing the equipment.
Equally important, SEMI S2 reduces enforcement-related transaction costs relating to the use of this information in the negotiation of DfE goals and timetables. It does this by establishing a third-party review system that enables transactors to assure the integrity of the performance information and assess supplier compliance with the provisions of SEMI S2.
Finally, our research also confirms that a major factor behind the development of the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards was the desire to legitimize aspects of environmental SCM to make supplier DfE and EMS a routine, generally accepted feature of procurement and supplier management in their industries. Those involved in the establishment and work of the committees that created the two standards wanted to use the standards to change attitudes and cultural mindsets in the industry. Their goal was to make managers in their industry more receptive to the notion that equipment and parts and components suppliers had an obligation to collect information about their environmental impacts and practices, to give this information to their customers, and on the basis of this information, to develop plans for improving their performance that met with the approval of their customers, not government regulators. In the case of the SEMI S2 standard, at least, they succeeded, and these activities have as a consequence been institutionalized into the new product and product improvement design processes at many semiconductor equipment companies.
An NIE Explanation for the Different Fates of the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC Standards
The NIE also provides insight into why, despite their many similarities in structure and purpose, the PIBA-CIQC standard died, whereas SEMI S2 achieved widespread acceptance. According to NIE theorists, there are two barriers that must be overcome for standards to be successfully developed and implemented. First, standards must meet the "remediableness" criterion to be feasible. To meet the remediableness test, a standard (or other institution) must provide more net economic gains on implementation than any other alternative approach to handling a given set of transactions. Rational economic actors (or "boundedly" rational economic actors, that is, actors lacking perfect information) can be expected to implement formal and informal rules to govern economic behavior only when they think sufficient economic incentives to do this exist. That is, they will do so when the standards offer more expected net gains than alternative institutions for structuring the economic transactions in question (Williamson 1996) .
Second is the challenge of legitimacy. The ease of generating widespread acceptance for a new standard is a function of its perceived legitimacy or rightfulness. For members of a group to accept a standard as legitimate, there must be broad agreement that the proposed rule will move the transacting community in a desired direction. Potential adopters must agree not only that it is aligned with their own self-interest, but also that it is aligned with the interests of enough members of the larger community of expected adopters to become the norm in their community (Besen 1995) . Further, to be viewed as legitimate, a critical mass of potential adopters must believe that the proposed standard has been developed through appropriate, generally accepted, consensual processes that are likely to provide net benefits to the broader community (Hawkins 1995; Leiss 1995; Foray 1995) .
The semiconductor industry embraced SEMI S2 because it met these legitimacy and remediableness criteria with flying colors. From the beginning, SEMI S2 derived legitimacy from SEMI's reputation as the semiconductor industry's preeminent technical-standard-setting organization. SEMI has issued over 400 standards since it established its North American standards-setting program in 1973. It has had such success as a standard-setting organization that it has preempted efforts by other organizations to set standards for this industry (Scace 2000; Pucel 1996 ; SEMI International Standards Program). The firms that participated in the SEMI S2 and other EH&S task forces benefited from SEMI's widely respected, consensus-based standards-setting processes and track record of promulgating successful standards, which have helped rationalize the industry. This reputation helped them mobilize support for SEMI S2.
Perhaps even more important, SEMI S2 offered substantial economic gains to adopters, the key to meeting the remediableness test. The involvement of powerful end users such as Intel, Motorola, and IBM in the SEMI S2 standardsetting and -revision processes helped the SEMI S2 task forces develop a standard that optimizes the economic interests of process-equipment purchasers as well as suppliers. As noted earlier, SEMI S2 simplifies and routinizes the administration of supplier DfE programs in ways that enable buyers and sellers to cut transaction and customization costs. A key to this success is SEMI S2's focus on guiding the collection and assuring the integrity of information needed to set meaningful DfE goals and its support of the mutually optimizing, efficiency-promoting negotiation and collaboration associated with relational contracting. These features of SEMI S2 allow semiconductor manufacturers and their equipment suppliers to pursue DfE projects that make business sense for both, a factor that has enhanced perceptions that it is a legitimate standard that moves the industry in a positive direction.
SEMI S2 created a framework for supplier DfE that has helped semiconductor manufacturers make substantial improvements in equipment performance. In contrast to the relatively intangible economic gains from improvements in EMSs, which accrue to overhead, the gains from DfE projects typically involve measurable reductions in energy, chemical, water, and other resource use, as well as reductions in costly accidental releases of toxic materials, all of which tend to reduce operating costs, often by substantial margins. For example, during the mid 1990s, using SEMI S2, TI worked closely with its chemical and other suppliers to develop equipment designs that would eliminate employee exposure to and reduce the handling, disposal, and abatement costs of 50 toxic chemicals associated with the design of the next-generation integrated circuits. Substitutes for all 50 chemicals were found, enabling TI to save $5 million annually per wafer fabrication plant worldwide. With its equipment vendors, TI also developed a method for recapturing and reclaiming the high-purity solvents used in photolithography, which reduced TI's chemical costs by $11 million annually, reduced cycle time, and eliminated solvent waste disposal. As a result of such efforts, TI's Houston fabrication facility reduced its hazardous waste by 45% between 1991 and 1997 and was able to recycle 70% of its nonhazardous waste. At two of its manufacturing sites, wastewater discharges were reduced to zero, and at one site, hazardous waste was completely eliminated (Sowell 1997) .
According to a study by Parker and Foster (1999, 257) , equipment sellers as well as buyers can gain from the R&D that takes place during DfEH&S projects. The study assessed the benefits of DfEH&S projects undertaken by Intel and Novellus, a major supplier of chemical and physical thin-film vapor deposition tools, under the guidance of SEMI S2. The conclusion was that the projects enabled the two firms to reduce their combined operating costs by a total of $1.2 million per year through reductions in scrubber exhaust costs and emissions reduction costs. Novellus also experienced a 50% reduction in internal engineering, third-party review, equipment change orders and redesign, and manufacturing costs associated with EH&S compliance, as well as a reduction in injuries to its employees, as a result of the improvements it made to its internal EMSs, information systems, and customer communications systems in order to comply with SEMI S2 (and other industry EH&S standards). The two companies also avoided a total of $21.6 million per year in capital costs. SEMI S2 has also helped semiconductor manufacturers speed up new product development times, a significant economic advantage in an industry in which competitive advantage depends a great deal on the speed with which firms can bring the next generation of powerful new chips to market. For example, according to Parker and Foster (1995, 257) , DfEH&S projects undertaken by Intel with Novellus enabled Intel to reduce the time it took get new products into production by two weeks, substantially reducing its factory start-up costs. The firms used SEMI S2 to identify and correct EH&S problems during the design process. This enabled Intel to avoid the time-consuming and costly tasks associated with performing inspections and retrofitting the equipment to correct the problems after it took delivery (Parker and Foster 1999) .
Another factor that has increased the economic value of SEMI S2 to semiconductor manufacturers is its requirement that equipment suppliers submit the EH&S documentation they compile on their products to an independent laboratory or safety consulting firm for review. This third-party review requirement standardizes a simple, cost-effective way for fabricators to protect themselves from what transaction cost economics economists call the "shirking hazard," that is, the risk that their equipment suppliers will cut corners when evaluating the environmental characteristics of their products and describing the steps they have taken to minimize their environmental impacts. 15 The requirement effectively shifts the burden of documenting compliance to suppliers, a big savings to semiconductor fabricators, while simultaneously giving suppliers a powerful incentive to collect the performance information in as professional a manner as possible, to avoid unfavorable reviews.
Because they stood to gain so much from the application of SEMI S2 in their equipment procurement processes, end users spearheaded formation of the original task force that created the standard. They were also highly motivated to force their suppliers to adopt it. Key backers included Intel, Motorola, and IBM, huge companies that controlled so much of the market for semiconductor equipment that many equipment suppliers had little choice but to adopt it. Although some vendors balked at first, most came around fairly quickly in order to keep these important companies as customers. Intel was so committed to SEMI S2's success that it worked with some of its small suppliers to help them overcome difficulties they were having trying to implement it.
In sharp contrast to SEMI S2, the PIBA-CIQC supplier questionnaire met neither the legitimacy nor the remediableness criteria for success and so never gained acceptance from the firms its creators had expected would embrace it. It failed to meet the legitimacy criterion in part because neither the PIBA nor the CIQC proved to be appropriate venues for developing a standard with such profound implications for computer industry parts and components suppliers. Neither organization had the industry clout or the international reach necessary to make such a standard stick. PIBA is a relatively small, West Coast-focused organization, whereas the CIQC was a tiny group of procurement managers from just seven large firms, none of which were inde-Journal of Industrial Ecology pendent parts or component suppliers. 16 As one of the PIBA questionnaire developers told us, in retrospect it seems unreasonable to have expected that a standard developed by a small number of people in relatively narrowly focused organizations could change the behavior of a large number of globally dispersed firms across the entire industry's supply chain. Neither organization had the ability to draw the critical mass of managers from OEMs and component suppliers from around the world into their standard-setting processes. Without this level of participation, the questionnaire was never perceived to represent the collective will of the industry, despite its double stamp of trade organization approval.
The PIBA-CIQC questionnaire also failed to meet the remediableness criteria in a clear and visible way, which further undercut its perceived legitimacy. In contrast to the measurable economic gains associated with the implementation of SEMI S2, the economic gains associated with implementing the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire were difficult to measure and document, making their magnitude uncertain. The questionnaire simplified and rationalized communications between OEMs and their parts and components suppliers around supplier EMSs, while leaving them free to negotiate improvement goals and timetables on a mutually optimizing, relational basis. It had the potential to enable OEMs to gain goodwill from environmentally oriented customers and reduce the risk of having their supplies disrupted by environmental accidents or regulatory problems at their suppliers' sites. It also created potential savings for suppliers and their customers in efficiencies associated with more effective EMSs. But, and this is a big "but," these benefits come in reduced overhead costs that are difficult to observe or attribute. Further, the benefits are in many cases in the avoidance of costs-for example, not having to hire additional personnel to complete questionnairesthat never show up on company accounts.
Another problem was that alternative methods for simplifying supplier EMSs emerged, alternatives that provided more net gains than the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire. For example, some companies discovered that they could satisfy customers and other stakeholders who were requesting information about their environmental SCM programs by sending them to a "frequently asked questions" site on the EH&S page of their corporate Web site. This was much simpler and less costly than trying to integrate the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire into their supplier-management programs, especially for companies that had not yet incorporated environmental elements into their supplier-management practices.
More important, the ISO, an organization with significant international stature and reach, issued its ISO 14001 EMS standard at about the same time as work on the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire ended. Although designed as an internal management standard, not an SCM standard, ISO 14001 quickly proved to be a useful supplier EMS tool. Our interviewees told us that its development took much of the steam out of their effort to implement the PIBA-CIQC standard. Not only did the ISO have much more organizational legitimacy than either PIBA or the CIQC as an international standards-setting organization, but ISO 14001 certification also offered tangible economic benefits not provided by the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire. In particular, asking a supplier to become ISO 14001 certified provides a measure of liability protection to OEMs interested in improving the environmental management policies and practices of their suppliers, as the auditing of the suppliers' performance is given over to a third-party, independent firm to provide certification. This is an important benefit to OEMs who fear that they will acquire liability for suppliers' environmental problems if they actively involve themselves in efforts to help them improve their EMS. Supplier ISO 14001 certification also provides benefits in the marketing area not possible with the less publicized and visible PIBA-CIQC questionnaire. ISO 14001 certification gives firms an internationally recognized eco-label attesting to their commitment to institute and continuously improve their EMSs. By asking their suppliers to become ISO 14001 certified, OEMs can demonstrate to their own customers that they are committed to encouraging their suppliers to improve their environmental management policies and practices in this well-recognized way.
In short, the reasons why the PIBA-CIQC questionnaire failed to achieve the level of acceptance reached by the SEMI S2 standard are clear when analyzed through an NIE lens. Quite simply, the former failed to meet the remediableness and legitimacy criteria for institutional success the way the latter did. As a result, with the exception of HP, none the computer industry's OEMs or their component suppliers felt a strong need to implement it, not even the other firms involved in its development.
The upshot is that computer OEMs have continued to use their own idiosyncratic, internal standards for administering their supplier EMS initiatives on an uncoordinated basis. Uniformity in the administration and conduct of these programs results more from imitation and the importance of relational contracting in their supplier-management programs overall than from the adoption of voluntary standards. HP, IBM, and some other firms with active supplier EMS programs are now asking (although at the time of this writing, not yet requiring) suppliers to obtain ISO 14001 certification. This is only a part what they ask of their suppliers, however. Each imposes a unique corporate organizational architecture on a distinctive set of supplier surveys, evaluation systems and scorecards, Webbased supplier-management and communication tools, on-site visits, and case-by-case negotiation of improvement goals and timetables.
Conclusion
The SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards are two of a growing number of voluntary environmental standards and certification programs developed by industry trade associations and business-oriented nongovernmental organizations in recent years that purport to put industry on the track of environmental sustainability. Observers disagree as to whether these programs serve the interest of moving business toward sustainable business practices. So far, research on the impact of specific programs on management practice is contradictory and inconclusive (e.g., King and Lenox 2000; Nash and Ehrenfeld 1997; Howard et al. 1999; Howard et al. 2000) . Some critics fault the proliferating standards on broader, more philosophical grounds, arguing that rule making by trade associations and business-oriented nongovernmental organizations enables multinational corporations to usurp the role of government, undermining the foundations of a democratic society by depriving ordinary citizens of a say in the formation of the laws that govern their societies (Bendell 2000; Korten 1995) . Approaching the subject from a management perspective, however, other observers argue that voluntary environmental standards are potentially important strategic tools that should be used where feasible to help firms achieve competitive advantage (Reinhardt 2000) .
The NIE perspective casts this debate in a different light. It draws attention to the way in which voluntary standards help business managers bring institutional order and efficiency to the administration of new corporate programs and business-to-business interactions for which there are no preexisting rules of the game to organize economic behavior. Our research indicates that environmental managers at several semiconductor fabricating companies and computer OEMs spearheaded the establishment of the SEMI S2 and PIBA-CIQC standards in order to address weaknesses in the institutional environment. These weaknesses made it much more difficult and costly for them to ask their vendors to improve their environmental performance. In the absence of government regulations or generally accepted customs to guide them, the fabricators' goal was to create a framework of rules and guidelines that they and their suppliers could follow in order to reduce transaction costs and increase the efficiency of improving the environmental performance of their supply chains. Both the SEMI S2 and the PIBA-CIQC standards were designed to enable the parties to coordinate their DfE and EMS activities to achieve economies of scale and coordination and avoid unnecessary transactions costs and customized effort, while permitting them to continue to take advantage of the benefits of relational contracting.
Our findings complement earlier research that suggests that voluntary environmental standards play a positive role in moving firms toward sustainability. They do so by helping instill norms in corporate culture that sanction values considered to be critically important to improving environmental performance, such as the idea that "senior management must be involved in environmental review and decision making, that im-provements in performance must be continuous" (Nash and Ehrenfeld 1997, 521) . Our study highlights the way in which standards can improve the economics of the process by which firms move toward more sustainable business practices, as well as reshape managerial attitudes toward sustainability goals.
The success of SEMI S2 suggests that industry trade organizations have the capacity to institute policies of self-regulation that, if appropriately structured and widely adopted, can simplify and reduce the cost of the interfirm collaboration needed to improve process and product design across industrial supply chains. Given the importance of design in industrial ecology, this is a hopeful finding. The success of SEMI S2 opens up the possibility that process equipment suppliers and buyers in other industries also might be able to use self-regulation to help themselves cut the cost and simplify transactions involved in working together. They, too, may thus be able to more efficiently redesign manufacturing technologies to reduce their pollution emissions; cut materials, energy, and water use; and make other improvements in environmental performance, potentially beyond the levels required by government regulation.
Some environmentalists may view the flexibility and compromise allowed by SEMI S2's embrace of relational contracting as a loophole rather than a benefit. This is a valid concern. The mutual optimization made possible by relational contracting is a private process that enables both parties to minimize their own costs in the context of the marketplace. It may very well not support the level of DfE that would be optimal from a social welfare perspective. What must be kept in mind, however, is that industry standards are voluntary, not compulsory like government regulations. Only when their provisions are aligned with economic incentives can standards make it economically rational for firms to willingly engage in behavior consonant with sustainability goals.
What makes SEMI S2 interesting as a potential industrial ecology tool is that it has helped make equipment and process DfE a viable business proposition in the semiconductor industry through voluntary processes, out of the public limelight, in the context of private transactions between buyer and seller. Not only has SEMI S2 led a number of equipment manufacturers to improve the EH&S features of their products, but it has also increased fabricators' demand for such products. This demand is now giving vendors the opportunity to use their achievements in the DfE area as a sales tool that confers competitive advantage in a fiercely competitive marketplace. This market change is solidifying SEMI S2's impact on the industry. If the market for lowenvironmental-impact process equipment continues to develop, it will finish the process of institutionalizing DfE in the semiconductor equipment industry by transforming the practice of DfE from an exercise in rule following into a generally accepted part of corporate strategy and a routine aspect of the exchange relationship between equipment suppliers and their customers.
One case study is not enough to support definitive conclusions regarding the economic utility of industry self-regulation in supplier DfE. More research is needed to assess the extent to which SEMI S2 has helped institutionalize DfE among SEMI members, to investigate how firms use SEMI S2 in their buyer-seller negotiations, and to evaluate the quality of the DfE being undertaken under SEMI S2's guidance.
Research is also needed to assess the extent to which the economic benefits of SEMI S2 may have been reduced by factors that undercut the efficiencies associated with standardization. A problem that has been studied in depth by economists is the possibility that standards can create rigidities in an economic system that stifle technological innovation and "lock" firms into suboptimal ways of doing things (David 1995; David and Rothwell 1996; Farrell and Saloner 1985; David 1987; Besen and Saloner 1989) . We think that several factors make SEMI S2 an exceptionally flexible and economically rational standard, including its focus on information rather than the definition of technical requirements and deadlines, its support of relational contracting, its voluntary nature, and the fact that it is under constant revision by its users. Further study is needed to confirm that it has not created rigidities that are causing problems, however.
A more significant concern is that the efficiency that SEMI S2 ideally brings to the conduct of supplier DfE projects could be undercut by the growing number of conflicting or even just slightly different, partially overlapping standards issued by various standard-setting bodies in the United States and Europe, 17 as well as by the use of different versions of SEMI S2 by semiconductor firms. The challenge of "harmonizing" SEMI S2 with other standards is a topic of growing interest and debate among SEMI EH&S staff and firms that attend EH&S workshops (SEMI EHS Interest Group 2001; SEMI ICRC 2001; Bullis 2000) .
In light of the importance attributed by other researchers to the role of external reviews and certifications in ensuring the integrity of voluntary standards (King and Lenox 2000) , more research is also needed to evaluate the economic impacts and controversies associated with SEMI S2's review requirement. According to one of our sources, many semiconductor equipment suppliers consider the review requirement an onerous and costly burden, whereas fabricators complain that the quality of the reviews is inconsistent, forcing them to continue to inspect and retrofit equipment, undermining the efficiencies they expected the standard to provide.
Finally, to assess the extent to which the SEMI S2 experience is transferable to other industries, research is also needed to evaluate the factors that enable trade organizations to develop supplier DfE standards that meet the legitimacy and remediableness criteria that lead members to institutionalize them in their own suppliermanagement programs. Some trade associations may have traditions and cognitive outlooks that make their members less inclined to adopt voluntary environmental standards than managers at semiconductor fabricators and equipment manufacturing firms, where the advantages of network externalities (the benefits that develop when electronic systems can interconnect with one another) have embedded compatibility and other standards deeply within the very structure of their industry (Lane 1997) . Others may, like PIBA and CIQC, lack the organizational capability to institute EH&S standards that achieve widespread acceptance.
Notwithstanding these concerns, SEMI S2's success is so impressive that voluntary standards surely warrant further research by industrial ecologists interested in developing institutional tools to facilitate environmentally sustainable design across industrial supply chains. Such research would help clarify whether voluntary standards based on the SEMI S2 model can be developed to reduce the transactions costs associated with supplier DfE in other industries.
As this study shows, the NIE provides a valuable theoretical framework for moving forward with this research agenda. NIE can also serve as a powerful conceptual tool for advancing other research agendas that concern the design of institutions to support sustainable business systems. So much else in industrial ecology-from extended producer responsibility, industrial symbiosis, and the servicization of products-involves creating new institutions to simplify and reduce the cost of creating and administering new patterns of interaction between buyers and suppliers in an industrial system. These cost-reducing institutions can be created by market forces, cultural processes, government regulation, and even court decisions, as well as by the enactment of voluntary standards by trade association committees. Economists have used NIE to analyze and assess the economic costs and benefits of all of these processes in the creation and administration of a wide range of formal and informal institutions that govern economic behavior in various markets. Industrial ecologists should take advantage of the opportunity to apply NIE insights to analyze the differences between U.S. and European approaches to product take-back, recycling, and industrial waste exchange and to assess the relative costs and benefits of the different approaches in specific contexts. This perspective can also be used to explore and evaluate other novel firm-to-firm and firm-to-end user interactions that define emerging sustainable business practices. NIE is a valuable addition to the toolbox of social science theories applicable to industrial ecology, one that lends itself to the sort of research and analysis that can be used to develop policy recommendations to move modern economic systems toward cost-effective environmental sustainability.
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Notes
1. The organization has since changed its name to the Electronics Industry Quality Conference. We refer to it as the CIQC in this article, because that was its name when members developed and adopted the PIBA questionnaire as CIQC Standard 0014. 2. Note that some computer and electronics manufacturers now ask their suppliers to become ISO 14001 certified as a means of ensuring that the suppliers implement EMSs. In this sense, ISO 14001 can be considered a substitute for the PIBA-CIQC standard, as we discuss later. Similarly, Responsible Care contains a product stewardship element that is supposed to put chemical manufacturers on a path toward taking a lifecycle approach to reducing their environmental impacts and thus creates expectations that they will work with their suppliers on DfE. In our view, however, neither ISO 14001 nor Responsible Care qualify as "supplier management" standards because, in contrast to the PIBA-CIQC and SEMI S2 standards, neither spells out rules by which the manufacturers are to interact with their suppliers around environmental issues. 3. The NIE field became a formal subfield in economics with the establishment of the International Society for New Institutional Economics in 1996. The organization's Web site can be accessed at www.isnie.org/ISNIE97.htm. Although the NIE field has its roots in work by economists published in the 1930s, research on the role of institutions in economic behavior failed to flourish until a new generation of economists in the 1970s and 1980s began to develop operationalized theories, such as transaction cost economics theory. For a brief history, see Williamson (1985) ; for a review article of current research in the NIE field, see Nelson and Sampat (2001) . 4. We revisited the following companies in 2001:
"Anonymous OEM" (a firm that wishes to remain anonymous), HP, IBM, Sun Microsystems, Intel, and STMicroelectronics. 5. The consultant was from the San Francisco office of WSP Environmental North America, an international environmental consulting firm.
6. For more on expropriation hazards, see Rosen and colleagues (2000) . Note that none of our interviewees explicitly identified expropriation risks as an issue, but all expressed considerable concern about mounting customization charges. 7. This description of SEMI S2 is based on the most recent 2002 version of the standard, SEMI S2-0302, the version available for download (for a $50 fee) at the SEMI Web site (semi.org) at the time we were preparing the final version of this article (March 2002) . It is a revision of the revised standard approved in 2000. All references to SEMI S2 pertain to this version, unless otherwise noted. At the time we conducted our original research (1998), we examined the working document prepared by the SEMI S2 Revision Task Force (SEMI 1998). 8. Detailed summaries of the questionnaire are available in Anderson and Choong (1997) and Krut and Karasin (1999) . 9. Among the most important supplementary standards are SEMI S7 and SEMI S10, "Safety Guideline for Risk Assessment," which provides consensus criteria for determining the level of risk associated with equipment features that do not conform to the intent of sections of SEMI S2 and other SEMI EH&S standards relating to the management of specific materials, emissions, and effluents that pose environmental or safety risks. 10. Links to upcoming EH&S technical workshops and symposia and papers and slide presentations from some past ones can be found on the SEMI EH&S home page at ͗www.semi.org/web/ wcontent.nsf/url/ehshome͘. 11. DfEH&S refers to design that seeks to improve the health and safety as well as the environmental characteristics of a product. Though DfEH&S is not a standard acronym, we use it to refer to the general design goals of the SEMI S2 standard, which were very broad, covering many health and safety characteristics of semiconductor process equipment (such as safety interlock systems, emergency shutdown, ergonomics, seismic protection, fire protection, etc.), not just environmental features. We also use DfEH&S when we discuss SEMI S2-guided firm design projects with EH&S elements where we were unable to distinguish specific environmental aspects. We use the conventional acronym (DfE) when we discuss design factors that specifically pertain to environmental design. 12. By bringing NIE theories to bear in our analysis, this article expands the scope of Andrews' agenda for a microeconomic foundation for industrial ecology, which called for the application of transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theory to analysis of individual and firm agency in industrial ecology (Andrews 2001) . O. E. Williamson, one of the leading theorists in both fields, explains the relationship between TCE and NIE in this way: Institutional economists seek to explain what happens in the institutional environment with regard to the creation and impact of the rules of the game on economic behavior, whereas TCE economists concentrate primarily on institutions of governance, or as he puts it, the "play of the game," to explain how rational economic actors structure their interactions with other actors within the context of a given set of institutions (Williamson 1998) . 13. Other research in this field focuses on the impact of committee-based standards on competitive strategy in the electronics and telecommunications industries (e.g., Besen and Farrell 1994; Shapiro and Varian 1999) and market structure (e.g., Gruber 2000; Gilbert 1992 ). We could find little work that focuses specifically on environmental standards. An exception, however, is an article by Leveque (1995) , who used an NIE framework to examine the economic incentives firms have to adopt different types of environmental standards and the informational and institutional factors that influence the efficiency of environmental standard setting. Although the authors of such work may not identify themselves as institutional economists, their work is still considered to fall in the NIE field as it concerns the impact on institutions in economic behavior and growth (Nelson and Sampat 2001) . 14. By establishing a consensual set of criteria to judge the severity of EH&S hazards, the SEMI S10 "Safety Standard for Risk Assessment" standard further streamlines the contracting process by relieving both parties of the burden of having to negotiate criteria for risk assessments on a caseby-case basis with each and every purchaser. 15. See the article by Rosen and colleagues (2000) for additional information on shirking hazards. 
